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not received a greater portion of his debt than other creditors could have received by
payments at the same time, it is not a voidable preference, regardless of the fact that
upon bankruptcy the creditor receives a greater percentage than others. So construed,
such partial payments as were made in the principal case have been held not voidable.
Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F. (2d) 614 (C.C.A. 8th 1930); Slayton v. Drown,
93 Vt. 290, 107 Ad. 307 (gig). The conflicting construction of the section is explained
by the fact that no technical definition is given the term "preference" in subsection
(b), and reliance must be placed upon the definition in (a). If (a) is read into (b), a
transfer can operate as a voidable preference if the final effect in the event of bankruptcy will be to enable one creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
that obtained by other creditors. And the word "then" may be treated as having been
inserted to preclude the possibility of avoiding a transfer which, at the time of its being
made, treated all creditors alike; as, for example, an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. The requirement that the creditor must "then have reasonable cause to
believe that a transfer would effect a preference" would be satisfied by proof that the
creditor knew of the debtor's insolvency and that like payments were not being made
to all creditors.
The National Bankruptcy Conference, recognizing the ambiguity of § 6o, has proposed a re-definition of a preference as a transfer by an insolvent debtor when such
transfer "is not made for the benefit in like proportion of all other creditors of the same
class, and is not accompanied by transfers giving all other creditors like benefits," and
seeks to make a preference voidable "if the creditor has, at the time when such transfer
is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent and that not all the
other creditors of the same class are then receiving like benefits." National Bankruptcy Conference, Proposed Amendments-Committee Print, May 15, 1935, at pp. 152,
'55. This re-definition seems desirable not only because it avoids a construction leading
to practical administrative difficulties in computing percentages and investigating the
bankrupt's balance sheet at the date of every transfer within the four-month period,
but also because it realizes one of the fundamental objectives of the Bankruptcy Actequality of treatment for creditors. 29 Yale L. J. 112 (i919); Bank v. Sherman, io
U.S. 406 (1879). A creditor could no longer receive ioo per cent as to the part paid
before bankruptcy, plus a pro rata share of the balance, or a total percentage greater
than that received by other creditors. Commerce-GuardianTrust and Savings Bank v.
Devlin, 6 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 6th 1925); Bronx Brass Foundry,Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.,
76 F. (2d) 935 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).

Banks-Constructive Trusts-Right of Trustee in Bankruptcy to Recover Funds
Placed in Non-designated Depository-[Federal].-A trustee in bankruptcy deposited
funds in a bank after being informed by the bank's vice-president that he presumed
the bank was an authorized depository for bankruptcy funds. The bank was not so
authorized and, upon its failure, the trustee sought a preference. Hdd, the trustee was
entitled to no preference, although some deposits were in cash and could be traced.
It re Bogena & Williams, 76 F. (2d) 950 (C.C.A. 7th 1935).
There is no dispute but that the ordinary general deposit of trust funds by a trustee
having power to make such a deposit results only in a debtor-creditor relation. In re
Bologh, 185 Fed. 825 (D.C. N.Y. i9u); i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees ioi (I935). A
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preference upon the insolvency of a bank is commonly obtained when public funds
have been wrongfully deposited on the ground that the bank has become a constructive
trustee. Board of Commissionersv. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49 (C.C.A. 6th 1907); American
Surety Co. v. Jackson, 24 F. (2d) 768 (C.C.A. 9th 1928); Huntsville Trust Co. v. Noel,
321 Mo. 749, 12 S.W. (2d) 751 (1928); Nelson v. State Bank, 354 M1.519, 188 N.E. 853
(1933). In these cases the wrong usually arises from failure to comply with some
statutory prerequisite to making the deposit. Douglasville v. Mobley, 169 Ga. 53, 149
S.E. 575 (1929); Brown v. Sheldon State Bank, 139 Iowa 83, 92, 117 N.W. 289 (1908).
Some courts hold that title to the funds does not pass to the bank because the trustee
has no right to deposit the money unless the provisions of the statute are complied
with. Leach v. FarmersSavings Bank, 204 Ia. Io83, 216 N.W. 748 (1927). It has been
suggested that, in accordance with the intention of the parties, title does pass but that
the bank acquires such title only by participating in the depositor's wrongful act and
should therefore be charged with a constructive trust. 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
103 (1935). The bank need not have actual knowledge of the illegality of the deposit;
it is sufficient that it knows of the nature of the funds and has not fulfilled the statutory
requirements necessary to validate such deposits. It is charged with notice both of the
statute and the fact that acceptance of a deposit without compliance therewith is unlawful. Gentry v. Page Bank, 322 Mo. 29, 14 S.W. (2d) 597 (1929); Yellowstone County
v. Bank, 46 Mont. 439, 128 Pac. 596 (1912). When the failure to satisfy the statute
arises from facts independent of, and unknown to, the bank, no notice of the breach of
duty by the depositor may be imputed to the bank and no trust is raised. Rankin v.
Benton State Bank, 81 Mont. 322, 263 Pac. 689 (1928).
The National Bankruptcy Act provides that courts of bankruptcy shall designate
banking institutions as depositories for the money of bankrupt estates, shall require
bond from such banking institutions, and that trustees shall deposit all money received by them in the designated depositories. 30 Stat. 557 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A.
§§ 101, 75a(3) (1898). Failure to comply with the direction to deposit in designated
depositories is a breach of the fiduciary's duty. i Collier, Bankruptcy 735 (12th ed.
1921); 2 Remington, Bankruptcy § 1129 (3d ed. 1923). The bank is actively participating in the breach of duty when it knowingly accepts a deposit of bankruptcy funds
without being a proper depository, either for want of proper designation, or for having
failed to file a bond. Courts have correctly applied a constructive trust to bankruptcy
funds under such circumstances. In re Potell, 53 F. (2d) 877 (D.C. N.Y. 1931); In re
Weiss et al., 2 F. Supp. 767 (D.C. N.Y. 1931); In re Ocean City Title and Trust Co's
Bond, 6 F. Supp. 311 (D.C. N.J. 1934); see In re Battani, 6 F. Supp. 376, 380 (D.C.
Mich. 1934). There are no substantial grounds upon which to distinguish these from
the principal case. The fact that the Potell case involved a receiver, instead of a trustee
in bankruptcy, is hardly a basis for distinction since the receiver, like the trustee, has
power to pass title by a general deposit, and is subject to the duty imposed by the
Bankruptcy Act to deposit in designated depositories. 2 Clark, Receivers § lo98 (2d
ed. 1929). In re Weiss is referred to as having been based on false representations. It is
only in the syllabus of the case that the basis for such a distinction can be found. The
facts of the case itself do not reveal whether there was more than innocent misrepresentation, an element which may even be found in the instant case. In re Ocean City
Title and Trust Co's Bond was not distinguished, except by implication, for having followed the above cited cases. On the other hand, where a deposit was wrongful because
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the bankruptcy court did not authorize the trustee, a bank, to deposit the fund with
itself as a bank, a constructive trust has been imposed. Hillsdale Grocery Co. v. National
Bank, 6 F. Supp. 773 (D.C. Mich. 1934). The refusal of the court in the principal case
to follow this trend of authority rested upon Hancock County v. Hancock National
Bank, 67 F. (2d) 421 (C.C.A. 5th 1933), where a deposit of county funds was accepted
by a bank which had not given bond and upon which no constructive trust was raised.
In the Hancock case, however, the deposit was not in violation of a statute since, as the
court found, the passing of a bond was not a condition precedent to the establishment
of a proper depository.
A further ground for the decision was the distinction found between cases "where
the bank by mandate of law is prevented from receiving deposits, and those where a
trustee is merely required to make his deposits in a certain bank." This distinction is
more apparent than real since in both situations the bank, having notice of the character of the funds and the requirements of the statute, is an active participant in the
breach of the fiduciary's duty by accepting the deposit. It is immaterial that in the
latter case the beneficial owners of the fund have a cause of action against the trustee
or his surety. Anerican, Surety Co. v. Jackson, 24 F. (2d) 768 (C.C.A. 9th 1928);
In re Bank of Nampa, 29 Idaho 166, 157 Pac. 1117 (1916). The equitable relief should
still be available to them, and should remain available even though the claim is prosecuted on their behalf by the errant fiduciary and may indirectly redound to his benefit.
Rights of the general creditors of the bank, under R.S. § 5236, 12 U.S.C.A. § 194
(1927), do not suffer as the bank has paid no value for the deposit and no preference is
permitted when the deposit cannot be traced. Spokane County v. Clark, 61 Fed. 538
(C.C.A. Wash. x894).
Constitutional Law-Taxation-General Income Tax as Reduction of Judges'
Salaries during Term of Office-[Montana].-The plaintiff, administratrix, sought to
enjoin the collection of a state income tax on the salary paid to a deceased judge, contending that the general income tax, as applied to judges' salaries, was unconstitutional. Held, the tax did not violate § 29, art. 8 of the Montana constitution which
prohibits the diminution of an official's salary during his term of office. Poorman v.
State Board of Equalization, 45 P. (2d) 307 (Mont. 1935).
To preclude the possibility that the legislative branch of the government might seek
to exercise influence over the judicial department by control over tenure and payment
of salaries, it was unanimously agreed in the constitutional convention that the salaries
of Federal judges should not "be diminished during their continuance in office."
Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of American States, 155, 403
(1927); U.S. Const. art. 3, § i. State constitutions have incorporated provisions excluding increases, as well as decreases, in compensation. ]ll. Const. art. 5,§ 23. Some
states have not restricted the protective provisions against diminution in salaries to
judges but have extended them to all public officers of the state. Mont. Const. § 29,
art. 8; Ky. Const. § 235. Where the latter provisions are in force, it has been generally
held that judges are public officers within the meaning of the constitution. Henderson
v. Boardof Comm'rs of Boulder County, 51 Col. 364, 117 Pac. 997 (1gI); State v. Moores,
61 Neb. 9,84 N.W. 399 (xgoo); McCracken County v. Reed, 125 Ky. 420, 'OI S.W. 348.
(1907). Some jurisdictions have held that even a general income tax, subjecting all
citizens to its provisions and not including judges, violates the constitutional safeguard

